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Abstract 
 
Purpose – This paper investigates the effect of foreign aid on governance in order to extend the 
debates on foreign aid and to verify common positions from Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’, Collier’s 
‘Bottom Billion’ and Eubank’s ‘Somaliland’. The empirical evidence is based on updated data 
from 52 African countries for the period 1996-2010.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – An endogeneity robust instrumental variable Two-Stage-Least 
Squares empirical strategy is employed.  
 
Findings – The findings reveal that development assistance deteriorates economic (regulation 
quality and government effectiveness) and institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) 
governance, but has an insignificant effect on political (political stability, voice and 
accountability) governance.  While, these findings are broadly in accordance with Moyo (2009) 
and Collier (2007) on weak governance, they neither confirm the Eubank (2012) position on 
political governance nor the Asongu (2012) stance on the aid-corruption nexus in his debate with 
Okada & Samreth (2012).  
 
Practical implications – The use of foreign aid as an instrument to influence the election and 
replacement of political leaders in Africa may have insignificant results. It is time to solve the 
second tragedy of foreign aid and that economists and policy makers start rethinking the models 
and theories on which foreign aid is used to influence economic, institutional and political 
governance in recipient countries.   
 
Originality/value – The paper extends the debate on foreign aid and institutions in Africa in the 
light a plethora of recent studies in the aid literature.   
 
JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55 
Keywords: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 For over five decades, the political economy of foreign aid has been widely debated in 
academic and policy-making circles. A large literature on institutions and development suggests 
that Africa is poor because it has poor institutions: dictatorship, lack of property rights, weak 
courts, contract enforcement, high corruption, political instability, violence and hostile 
regulatory environments for private business. According to this view, in order to end African 
poverty, the West needs to promote good institutions. In 2005, the West tried hard to salvage 
Africa. In July of that year, the Group of Eight (G8) agreed to double foreign aid to Africa from 
$25 billion a year to $50 billion to finance the ‘Big push’, as well as scrap African aid loans 
contracted during previous attempts at a ‘Big push’. Prior to this effort, Africa was already the 
most aid-intensive continent in the world. In September of that same year, world leaders met at 
the United Nations to further discuss progress on ending poverty in Africa (Easterly, 2005a; 
Asongu & Jellal, 2013).  
 After ‘Can aid save Africa?’ by Easterly (2005a), the ‘Bottom Billion’ (Collier, 2007), 
‘Dead Aid’ (Moyo, 2009), the Eubank (2012) Somaliland hypothesis and the aid-corruption 
nexus debate (Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2012a; Asongu & Jellal, 2013) have had an 
important impact in advancing currents of the debates.  
 First, the ‘Bottom Billion’ (Collier, 2007) argues that foreign aid that is managed through 
the Official Development Assistance (ODA) program has not yielded expected fruits because 
many aid-dependent nations are weak in governance and fragile. He postulates that four main 
traps are standing in the way of aid effectiveness: dependence on natural resources, conflicts & 
mismanagement, weak governance in small countries, landlocked with bad neighbors and 
conflicts. According to the narrative, the “bottom billion” of the world is not benefiting enough 
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from the ODA program because strategies are based on quantities of aid (e.g meeting a certain 
threshold of donor economic prosperity). This strand is in line with the stance that ODA 
promotes a ‘regional public bad’, especially with no significant counter balancing a ‘regional 
public good’ effect (Collier & Hoeffler, 2007).  
 Another accomplished literature that has been the object of much discussion is Moyo’s 
‘Dead Aid’ (2009). According to the author, aid creates dependency, increases poverty and 
weakens domestic governance. Whereas the motivations of her work have inspired a recent 
strand of the literature (Banuri, 2013; Marglin, 2013; Wamboye et al., 2013; Asongu, 2012a, 
2013a; Asongu & Jellal, 2013; Ghosh, 2013; Krause, 2013; Asongu, 2014a; Titumir & Kamal, 
2013; Monni & Spaventa, 2013), there has also been a lot of criticisms on the foundations of her 
position. In essence, some of the classic concerns she tackles are clouded with missing links; the 
nexus between accountability and aid; the way in which she uses aid to substantiate her stances 
(especially the confusion between correlation and causality in the aid-growth relationship). 
While the thesis does not incorporate humanitarian and emergency relief assistance, her critics 
have left no stone unturned in blasting her viewpoint. Among them, the criticisms of Bill Gates 
and Jeffrey Sachs merit some emphasis. The former has recently qualified Moyo’s  book as 
promoting evil because she does not understand development assistance and that her thesis is not 
morally acceptable (Asongu, 2014a). The latter (Sachs, 2009) also maintains that Moyo has 
benefited from foreign aid and her book is unrealistic
1
.  
                         
1
 According to Sachs (2009), foreign aid is needed at the early stages of development. He insists that Moyo lacks the 
moral values to substantiate her position because she received scholarships to study in the best world universities 
(Harvard & Oxford) and later in life, thought  that it was  inappropriate to give a $10 aid package for an anti-malaria 
bed net to an African child. He further highlights that ‘Dead Aid’ is unrealistic by not taking into account the 
realities of life such as  general need of help in one way or another at one point in life.  
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 The Eubank (2012) Somaliland-based hypothesis that is broadly consistent with the 
‘Bottom Billion’ and ‘Dead Aid’ has also been celebrated with the 2013 award for best paper 
from the Journal of Development Studies. According to this thesis, the dependence of a State on 
local tax income, gives taxpayers leverage on demanding more representative political 
institutions and accountability from government. Hence, Eubank has broadly confirmed the 
‘Bottom Billion’ and ‘Dead Aid’ positions from a Somaliland point of view in the perspective of 
political governance. However, it should be noted that Eubank’s hypothesis is still in need of 
some empirical structure if it is to extend beyond Somaliland.  
 In light of the above, recently Somaliland’s minister of energy and minerals (Hussein 
Abdi Dualeh) has openly professed during an African mining conference that Somaliland was 
better without foreign aid and did not even need it: “That is a blessing in disguise. Aid never 
developed anything…Aid is not a panacea, we’d rather not have it….How many African 
countries do you know that developed because of a lot of aid? It’s a curse. The ones that get the 
most aid are the ones with the problems….We’ve been left to our own devices. We are our own 
people and our own guys. We pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps. We owe absolutely 
nothing to anybody. We would not change hands with Greece today. We have zero debt” 
(Stoddard, 2014).  
The recent debate on the effect of foreign aid on corruption has also had an important 
influence in policy and academic circles. The conclusion of Okada & Samreth (2012) that 
foreign aid decreases corruption in developing countries has been rejected by Asongu (2012a) in 
Africa. Asongu & Jellal (2013) have used indirect mechanisms to reconcile the debate by 
sustaining that, while foreign aid that is channeled through government expenditure increases 
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corruption, development assistance which goes through the private investment mechanism 
decreases corruption.  
 Drawing from the above, this paper aims to provide more insights on the common 
governance position from Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’, Collier’s ‘Bottom Billion’ and Eubank’s 
‘Somaliland’ using updated data (1996-2010). Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate 
this aid-institutions nexus in light of recent developments because the underlying motivation of 
the ODA program has been bridge the saving-investment gap poor countries face (Rostow, 1960; 
Chenery & Strout, 1966; Easterly, 2005a). Hence, the great bulk of studies have focused on the 
effect of aid flows on GDP growth and other macroeconomic variables (investment or public 
consumption). Surprisingly there has been much less research conducted on the impact of 
foreign aid on the evolution of government institutions.  
The linkages among aid, institutions and development are substantially discussed in 
Section 2. Moreover, the interest of the study also draws from the view that good institutions are 
essential for economic development and that foreign assistance should promote them (Ghura, 
1995, Burnside & Dollar, 2000). In this respect, assessing the effect of development assistance 
on governance dynamics is relevant for economic development. In the same vein, the limitations 
and criticisms towards foreign assistance provided above have been contrasted with more 
positive accounts  of foreign aid, among others: short-term positive effects on growth (Clement 
et al., 2004) and reduction of poverty (Ishfaq, 2004).  
Drawing from the literature discussed above, this study assesses the effect on governance 
dynamics of foreign aid in 52 African countries for the period 1996-2010. The main contribution 
of the paper is to extend the debate of foreign aid and institutions, with  particular emphasis on 
six governance dynamics, notably: political governance (voice & accountability and political 
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stability/non-violence), economic governance (regulation quality and government effectiveness) 
and institutional governance (corruption-control and rule of law). In so doing, we further 
contribute to the evolving debate on the effect of foreign aid on institutions in Africa.  
 The remainder of this paper is presented as follows. Section 2 examines existing 
literature on the aid-development nexus. The data and methodology are presented in Section 3. 
The empirical analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2 Aid, institutions and development 
 
 According to Easterly (2005a), empirics and theories on foreign aid in Africa could be 
highlighted in four main strands. First, the financing gap and/or ‘Big-Push’ models with 
corresponding scholarly feedbacks or reactions (Boone, 1996; Collier et al., 2001;  Devarajan et 
al., 2002; Sachs, 2005; Kraay & Raddatz, 2005; Masud & Yontcheva, 2005). Second, project 
interventions related to health and education, with some consensus on the positions that Africa’s 
poverty originates from poor human capital (education and health), corruption in health systems 
and deteriorating or poor infrastructure (Filmer & Pritchett, 1997; Filmer et al., 2000; Pritchett & 
Woolcock, 2004).  Non-financial factors are also responsible for sanitation issues in the African 
continent (Njoh, 2012) and there are growing suggestions that the health policy debate should be 
reoriented on poverty and social inequality (Obeng-Odoom, 2012). Third, the role of 
‘multinational organizations’ and ‘growth models’ in mishandling ‘aid policy adjustments’ 
(Alesina & Dollar, 2002; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Van de Walle, 2001; Easterly, 2005b). 
Fourth, dysfunctional donors and poor institutional quality: as some of the reasons for failing aid 
(Svensson, 2000; Knack, 2001; Djankov et al., 2005).  
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With some exceptions to micro levels (Jones, 2012), the literature on the effectiveness of 
foreign assistance has been substantially oriented towards the macroeconomic impacts of aid: 
assessing its effects on economic savings, investment and growth. The depth of analytical 
frameworks, rely heavy on empirical evidence (which is often ambiguous at best) and 
inconclusive results with recently refined methodologies (Masud & Yontcheva, 2005) leaves the 
subject widely open to debate. For brevity, prior exposition on the effectiveness of aid on growth 
(or economic development) could be classified into two strands as summarized in Table 1: one 
by acknowledging the negative consequences of aid and the other by advocating the positive 
rewards of development assistance (Asongu, 2015). The table is meant to present a broad 
perspective of underlying connections and the interested reader can find greater insights into 
them in McGillivray et al. (2006).  
 
 
Table 1: Summary of conflicts in the literature 
 Researchers Main findings  
  
First-strand: Aid improves growth (or economic development) 
 
Ghura (1995) Aid positively impacts savings for good adjusters.  
  
Burnside & Dollar (2000) Aid can be effective when policies and economic management are good. 
  
Guillaumont &  Chauvet (2001) Aid effectiveness is contingent on environmental factors (shocks and hazards). 
  
Collier & Dehn (2001) Aid effectiveness depends on negative supply shocks. The targeting of aid 
contingents on negative supply shocks is better than targeting based on good 
policies.  
  
Collier & Dollar (2001) The positive effect of aid on poverty depends on its impact on per capita 
income growth and per capita income growth on poverty 
reduction. 
  
Feeny (2003) The sectoral allocation of foreign aid to Papua New Guinea has been broadly 
in line with a strategy to effectively reduce poverty and increase human 
wellbeing.  
  
Gomanee et al. (2003) Aid has both a direct effect on welfare and an indirect effect through public 
spending on social services.  
  
Clement et al. (2004) Aid has a short-term positive impact on growth. 
  
Ishfaq (2004) Foreign aid, in a limited way has helped to reduce the extent of poverty in 
Pakistan. 
  
Mosley et al. (2004) Foreign assistance has an indirect impact on poverty and the wellbeing of 
recipient countries. 
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Addison et al. (2005) Aid increases pro-poor public expenditure and has a positive effect on growth. 
Aid broadly works to mitigate poverty, and poverty would be higher in the 
absence of aid. 
  
Fielding et al. (2006) There is a straight forward positive impact of aid on development outcomes.  
  
Sachs (2009) Aid is needed at the early stages of development.  
  
Minou & Reddy (2010) Development assistance positively affects growth in the long-term. 
  
Okada & Samreth (2012)  Foreign aid reduces corruption.  
  
Asongu & Jellal (2013) Aid channeled through private investment and tax effort decreases corruption. 
  
 
Second-strand: Aid does not lead to growth (or economic development) 
 
Mosley et al. (1992) Aid increases unproductive public consumption and fails to promote growth. 
  
Reichel (1995) Aid fails to promote savings owing to the substitution effect. 
  
Ghura (1995) Aid negatively impacts savings. 
  
Boone (1996)  Aid is insignificant in improving economic development for two reasons: 
poverty is not caused by capital shortage and it is not optimal for politicians to 
adjust distortionary policies when they receive aid flows. 
  
Pedersen (1996) Foreign Aid distorts development and leads to aid dependency. 
  
 
Collier (2007) 
Aid is not a task that can be handled by Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) because aid-recipient countries are for the most part fragile and 
characterized by histories of conflicts, weak governance and limited good 
governance mechanisms with which to effectively disburse aid.  
  
 
Collier & Hoeffler (2007) 
Potentially, foreign aid is promoting a ‘regional public bad’ and there seems to 
be no regional public good impact offsetting the ‘public bad’ originating from 
the arms race in neighboring countries.  
  
Moyo (2009) Foreign aid has increased dependency, poverty and corruption in Africa.  
  
  
Asongu (2012a)  Foreign aid fuels corruption and mitigates the control of corruption  
  
Asongu (2014b) Foreign aid increases corruption in English common-law and Christian- 
dominated African countries.  
  
Asongu & Jellal (2013) Aid channeled through government expenditure increases corruption.  
  
Source (Author). 
 
 In the first strand, we find studies in favor of the positive effects of aid on growth and 
development. Among these works, we shall highlight that of Burnside & Dollar (2000) which 
concludes that aid is effective when policies are good. The Burnside & Dollar (2000) paper has 
received abundant comments from researchers (Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001; Colier & Dehn, 
2001; Easterly et al., 2003); comments which have been challenged as being “extremely data 
dependent” (Clemens et al., 2004). Minou & Reddy (2010) have concluded that development 
assistance positively affects growth in the long-run, broadly confirming Sachs’ (2009) position 
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on the importance of aid in the early stages of development. A study by Okada & Samreth 
(2009) on developing countries concludes that aid decreases corruption. Asongu & Jellal (2013) 
think the decreasing effect advanced by Okada & Samreth is more apparent when aid is 
channeled through private investment activities.  
The second strand includes authors presenting the case for the insignificant and/or 
negative impact of aid on investment, savings or growth. Aid has been shown to improve 
unproductive public consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) and stops short of increasing investment. 
This latter point has been confirmed by Boone (1996) and Reichel (1995). Ghura (1995) has 
articulated the negative effect of aid on domestic savings while Pedersen (1996) asserts that 
foreign aid distorts development and leads to aid dependency. The common positions of Collier 
(2007), Collier &  Hoeffler (2007), Moyo (2009), Asongu (2012a) and Asongu & Jellal (2013) 
have been engaged in the introduction.  
Consistent with Asongu & Jellal (2013), the interesting literature on foreign assistance 
and institutions has been focused around three principal questions. “First, do donors allocate 
more to poor states with better institutions? Second, does development assistance induce better 
or worse institutions? Third, how do outsiders engineer a transition from informal institutions 
towards more formal institutional settings through foreign aid?” (p. 2197).   The present line of 
inquiry is consistent with the second question. We briefly discuss the findings of some articles 
that have investigated the effect of foreign aid on institutions. Boone (1996) has established that 
political elitist models are more relevant in predicting the impact of development assistance and 
the fact that the effect of aid does not change significantly based on the democratic quality of the 
recipient government. Hence, as a policy implication, short-run aid targeting liberal political 
regimes could be more feasible in mitigating poverty. Tavares (2003) has assessed the effect of 
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foreign aid on corruption using cultural and geographical distance to conclude that foreign 
assistance reduces corruption.  Rajan & Subramanian (2007) have concluded that aid may be 
linked with weak governance: a position supported by Brautigam and Knack (2004, p. 266) in 
their conclusion that high levels of foreign aid in African negatively affect governance. 
The evolving debate on the effect of foreign aid on institutions in Africa, on which this 
study is partly based, has been discussed in the introduction. For brevity and lack of space, we 
refer the interested reader to Asongu (2015) for insights into the narratives involved.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
 We investigate a panel of 52 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) for the period 1996 to 2010. Corresponding variables 
are presented in Appendix 3. Consistent with the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2005) and 
Kaufmann et al. (2010), the adopted governance dependent variables include: political 
governance (voice & accountability and political stability), economic governance (regulation 
quality and government effectiveness) and institutional governance (rule of law and corruption-
control). The choice of these variables is in accordance with recent African institutional literature 
(Asongu, 2012bc). Borrowing from Asongu (2012a), the independent variable of key interest is 
Net Official Development Assistance (NODA). For robustness purposes we use total NODA, 
NODA from multilateral donors and NODA from the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) countries. Instrumental variables are income-levels, legal-origins and religious-
dominations.  
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 These instruments have been substantially documented in the economic development 
literature (La Porta et al., 1997; Beck et al., 2003; Asongu, 2011, 2012b, 2013b, 2014ac). They 
are also consistent with recent African human development (Asongu, 2013b, 2014a), finance 
(Asongu, 2012c) and institutions (Asongu, 2012a) literature. In essence, the following intuitions 
motivate the choice of the instrumental variables. First, economic prosperity in terms of wealth-
effects or income-levels influence aid allocation decisions, since higher income-countries 
naturally become less reliant on aid over time. Second, colonial legacy also affects how colonial 
powers allocate development assistance. Expectedly, more aid is disbursed to former colonies as 
means of preserving strategic goals. Third, it is difficult to object to the fact that faith plays a role 
in aid allocation decisions. This intuition has been recently verified on the ‘Musilm-ness’ of aid 
recipients in ‘faith and foreign aid’ (Loud et al., 2008; Asongu, 2014a). The underlying foreign 
aid literature that has included the above instruments, include (Asongu 2012a, 2014a).  
 In the regressions, we control for openness (trade) and population growth in the baseline 
and for democracy and public investment in the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). First, on the 
baseline regressions used to assess the strength of the instruments (1) population growth has 
been established to increase foreign aid in African countries (Asongu, 2014a) and (2) the 
intuition that more trade has had the potential to increase development assistance is consistent 
with literature on Sino-African relations (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013). Second, democracy 
(Asongu, 2012a, pp. 2178) and public investment (Asongu, 2014a) have also been established to 
positively affect institutions for the same period and sample of African countries.  
The choice of control variables is also contingent on the degrees of freedom necessary for 
overidentifying restrictions tests on two-stage regressions. Accordingly, more than two control 
variables will result in exact- or under-identification: meaning the instruments are either equal-to 
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or less-than the number of endogenous explaining variables respectively. The summary statistics 
and correlation matrix are also presented in the appendices (Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 
respectively). While the former indicates that the distributions of the variables are comparable, 
the latter guides the empirical analysis in avoiding issues related to multicollinearity and 
overparameterization.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Endogeneity  
 
 While development assistance has a bearing on the development of the recipient country 
(Addison et al., 2005; Fielding et al., 2006), the reversed effect cannot be ruled-out as aid from 
donor agencies (countries) is contingent on institutional  and  developmental characteristics. 
Such factors maybe environmental (Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001), supply-shocks (Collier & 
Dehn, 2001) or even effective policies and economic management standards (Burnside & Dollar, 
2000). Moreover, the literature on how government quality influences foreign aid is not clear-
cut: a strand shows evidence that governments of questionable institutional standards receive no 
less aid (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Acht et al., 2014); another area explains why corrupt 
governments receive more foreign aid (De la Croix & Delavallade, 2012), while a third stream 
advocates for  the levels of domestic government quality which is crucial in foreign aid location 
decisions (Alesina & Weder, 2002 ). We resist engaging this debate. What is common to the 
underlying strands that matter to us is the possibility of reverse causality which raises a potential 
issue of endogeneity. In essence, our focus is not on the positive or negative direction of such 
causality, but rather its mere existence.  We are thus faced with a concern of endogeneity owing 
to reverse-causality and omitted variables, as the NODA indicators are correlated with the error 
term in the equation of interest. To address this concern we shall assess the presence of 
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endogeneity with the Hausman-test and then employ an estimation technique that takes account 
of the endogeneity issue. 
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique  
 
Concurring with Beck et al. (2003) the paper adopts an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimation method. Estimation by IV addresses the puzzle of endogeneity and thus avoids the 
inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the exogenous 
variables are correlated with the error term in the main equation. The adopted 2SLS estimation 
method entails the following steps. 
First-stage regression:  
 
 itit nlegalorigiNODA )(10  itreligion)(2 itlincomeleve )(3  ititiX        (1)             
                               
                                                                  
Second-stage regression: 
 
 itit NODAtQualityGov )(' 10  itiX   it                                                    (2)                                                                                        
 
In the two equations, X represents the set of control variables.  and   in the first and 
second equations, respectively denote the disturbance terms. Instrumental variables include: 
legal-origins, dominant-religions and income-levels. NODA stands for Net Official Development 
Assistance and Gov’tQuality represents a given dimension of governance. .  
We adopt the following steps in the analysis. First, justify the choice of a 2SLS over an 
OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity. Second, show that the 
instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining variables (aid channels), 
conditional on other covariates (control variables). Third, ensure the instruments are valid and 
not correlated with the error-term in the main equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. 
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3.2.3 Robustness checks   
 
To ensure robustness of the analysis, the following checks are performed: (1) usage of 
alternative indicators of Government Quality (GQ) dynamics; (2) employment of two distinct 
interchangeable sets of moment conditions that encompass every category of the instruments; (3) 
usage of alternative aid indicators; (4) account for the concern of endogeneity and (5) estimation 
with robust Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors.   
 
4. Empirical Analysis  
 
This section addresses: the ability of the exogenous components of NODA dynamics to 
account for differences in GQ dynamics; the ability of the instruments to explain variations in the 
endogenous components of NODA dynamics and the possibility of the instruments  accounting 
for GQ dynamics beyond NODA dynamic channels. To make these examinations we use the 
panel 2SLS-IV estimation method with legal-origins, income-levels, and religious-dominations 
as instrumental variables. 
 
4.1 Development assistance and instruments  
 
 Table 2 below investigates the validity of the instruments in explaining cross-country 
differences in NODA dynamics. In order to mitigate issues of perfect multicollinearity, the idea 
is to use a dummy for each category of each variable (all in the same regression), and then 
examine their significance. Hence, in interpreting the results, it is important to note that the goal 
is to determine whether these instruments and controls capture different aspects of the dynamics 
of foreign assistance. Clearly, it could be noticed that distinguishing African countries by legal-
origins, income levels and religious-dominations help explain cross-country differences in 
NODA. Based on the Fisher-test, the instruments taken collectively enter significantly in all 
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regressions at the 1% significance level.  Broadly the following conclusions could be established. 
First, Christian-dominant countries have benefited more or less in foreign-aid than their Islam-
oriented counterparts depending on which definition of  NODA is used. Second, in line with 
common sense and economic theory, Low-income countries receive more aid than Middle-
income countries. The control variables have the expected signs. This is essentially because, due 
to export substitution, foreign aid could increase with population growth and economic 
openness.  
 
Table 2: Baseline regressions  
  Net Official Development Assistance(NODA) 
  NODAgdp NODAMDgdp  NODADACgdp 
  1
st
 Set 2
nd
 Set  1
st
 Set 2
nd
 Set  1
st
 Set 2
nd
 Set  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instruments  
Constant 5.927*** -3.094* 2.008*** -2.592*** 3.907*** -0.383 
 (3.842) (-1.806) (3.030) (-3.522) (3.803) (-0.336) 
English   0.174 --- 0.513 --- -0.347 --- 
 (0.210)  (1.440)  (-0.630)  
French  --- -0.174 --- -0.513 --- 0.347 
  (-0.210)  (-1.440)  (0.630) 
Christianity 0.155 --- -0.789** --- 0.995* --- 
 (0.179)  (-2.120)  (1.723)  
Islam  --- -0.155 --- 0.789** --- -0.995* 
  (-0.179)  (2.120)  (-1.723) 
L.Income --- 9.351*** --- 4.324*** --- 4.937*** 
  (9.195)  (9.896)  (7.291) 
M. Income -13.048*** --- -5.540*** --- -7.410*** --- 
 (-10.99)  (-10.86)  (-9.372)  
LMIncome 3.696*** --- 1.216** --- 2.472*** --- 
 (2.973)  (2.277)  (2.986)  
UMIncome --- -3.696*** --- -1.216*** --- -2.472*** 
  (-2.973)  (-2.277)  (-2.986) 
 
 
Control 
Variables  
Popg 2.439*** 2.439*** 1.287*** 1.287*** 1.128*** 1.128*** 
 (5.912) (5.912) (7.263)) (7.263) (4.108) (4.108) 
Trade  0.037*** 0.037*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.016** 0.016** 
 (3.471) (3.471) (4.208) (4.208) (2.346) (2.346) 
        
Adjusted R² 0.294 0.294 0.321 0.321 0.216 0.216 
Fisher Statistics 47.342*** 47.342*** 53.563*** 53.563*** 31.774*** 31.774*** 
Observations 668 668 668 668 668 668 
L: Low. LM: Lower Middle. UM: Upper Middle. Ivt: Investment. Pop: population. *;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. NODAgdp: NODA on GDP.  NODAMDgdp: NODA from Multilateral Donors on GDP.  NODADACgdp: NODA  from DAC  
countries on GDP.  Student statistics ratios in brackets. 1st Set: First  Set of Instruments . 2nd Set: Second Set of Instruments. 
 
 
 
 
 17 
4.2 Development assistance and quality of government   
 
 
Table 3 investigates two main issues: (1) the ability of NODA channels to account for 
GQ dynamics and (2) the possibility of the instrumental variables explaining GQ dynamics 
beyond NODA channels.  Whereas we tackle the first issue by assessing the significance of 
estimated coefficients, the second is assessed with the Sargan-OIR test.  Three main features of 
governance are investigated here. First, political governance decomposed into (i) political 
stability and (ii) voice & accountability: defined as the election and replacement of political 
leaders. Second, economic governance which reflects the formulation and implementation of 
policies that deliver public goods is measured by (i) government effectiveness and (ii) regulation 
quality . Last, institutional governance which is the respect by citizens and the State of 
institutions that govern interactions between them is measured by (i) corruption-control and (ii) 
the rule of law. These definitions are consistent with Kaufmann et al. (2010).  
The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is the view that the instruments account for GQ 
dynamics only through NODA channels. Thus a rejection of the null hypothesis is the rejection 
of the view that the instruments explain GQ dynamics through no other mechanisms than NODA 
channels. The Hausman-test for endogeneity precedes every IV regression and justifies the 
choice of the estimation technique. The null hypothesis of this test is the view that OLS estimates 
are efficient and consistent. Therefore, a rejection of the null hypothesis points to the issue of 
reverse causality (endogeneity) we have emphasized above (see Section 3.2.1) and hence lends 
credit to the 2SLS-IV estimation technique. Otherwise OLS is used in the modeling exercise. For 
robustness checks, results are replicated using an alternative set of instrumental variables, as 
shown in the bottom lines of Table 3. In modeling the unrestricted regressions presented in Table 
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3, the null hypothesis of the Hausman-test is rejected for all the regressions, confirming the 
presence of endogeneity and hence the choice of the corresponding 2SLS-IV approaches. 
With regard to the first concern which is addressed by the significance of estimated 
coefficients, it can be firmly established that NODA dynamics significantly decrease GQ 
dynamics in Africa. It follows that development assistance destined for the African continent 
decreases the political stability, voice and accountability, regulation quality and the rule of law, 
as well as control of corruption and government effectiveness. These results are broadly 
consistent with the strand of the aid-development literature which  has established that 
development assistance: increases corruption in ethnically fractionalized countries (Svensson, 
2000), worsens bureaucratic quality, leads to violation of  the law with greater impunity and 
more corruption (Knack, 2001) and causes setbacks to democracy (Djankov et al., 2005).  
Table 3: Two-stage regressions without HAC standard errors  
 Political Stability Government Effectiveness Control  of Corruption 
          
Constant  -1.080*** -1.089*** -1.093*** 0.198 -0.155 -0.066 -0.631*** -0.649*** -0.621*** 
 (-2.661) (-2.704) (-2.629) (0.376) (-0.487) (-0.191) (-9.100) (-9.674) (-8.519) 
NODAgdp  -0.026*** --- --- -0.050*** --- --- -0.023*** --- --- 
 (-3.938)   (-5.904)   (-6.010)   
NODAMDgdp  --- -0.062*** --- --- -0.087*** --- --- -0.053*** --- 
  (-3.979)   (-6.419)   (-6.006)  
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.046*** --- --- -0.068*** --- --- -0.041*** 
   (-3.778)   (-6.131)   (-5.781) 
Democracy  0.173*** 0.177*** 0.171*** 0.116*** 0.127*** 0.116*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.104*** 
 (6.653) (6.907) (6.377) (4.672) (5.766) (4.834) (5.752) (5.892) (5.475) 
Public Investment  0.040 0.038 0.043 --- -0.068* -0.070* --- --- --- 
 (0.838) (0.795) (0.880)  (-1.766) (-1.686)    
          
Hausman-test 26.843*** 26.922*** 29.052*** 103.89*** 104.11*** 120.05*** 49.346*** 50.302*** 49.910*** 
OIR-Sargan test 0.199 0.003 0.709 1.603 2.143 0.000 0.039 0.695 0.214 
P-value [0.654] [0.950] [0.399] [0.205] [0.143] [0.983] [0.980] [0.706] [0.898] 
Adjusted R² 0.325 0.324 0.314 0.102 0.205 0.186 0.177 0.172 0.167 
Fisher Statistics 27.534*** 27.823*** 26.081*** 21.992*** 32.020*** 28.389*** 34.280*** 34.523*** 31.793*** 
Observations 452 452 452 399 443 443 514 514 514 
          
 Voice and Accountability Regulation Quality Rule of Law 
          
Constant  -0.693** -0.686** -0.706* -0.204 -0.259 -0.180 -0.357 -0.415 -0.334 
 (-2.479) (-2.466) (-2.515) (-0.603) (-0.777) (-0.510) (-0.993) (-1.160) (-0.896) 
NODAgdp  -0.008* --- --- -0.030*** --- --- -0.033*** --- --- 
 (-1.876)   (-5.371)   (-5.575)   
NODAMDgdp  --- -0.021** --- --- -0.068*** --- --- -0.074 --- 
  (-1.968)   (-5.221)   (-5.332)  
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.014* --- --- -0.054*** --- --- -0.060*** 
   (-1.772)   (-5.263)   (-5.512) 
Democracy  0.198*** 0.199*** 0.198*** 0.115*** 0.121*** 0.112*** 0.139*** 0.146*** 0.135*** 
 (11.08) (11.26) (10.94) (5.337) (5.712) (4.932) (6.038) (6.399) (5.612) 
Public Investment  -0.057* -0.058* -0.055* -0.053 -0.052 -0.053 -0.049 -0.048 -0.048 
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 (-1.704) (-1.746) (-1.657) (-1.323) (-1.301) (-1.267) (-1.137) (-1.115) (-1.080) 
          
Hausman-test 46.888*** 44.846*** 42.808*** 48.153*** 44.185*** 54.739*** 81.226*** 79.312*** 89.942*** 
OIR-Sargan test 0.685 0.338 1.038 1.890 4.163** 0.612 2.559 5.310** 0.929 
P-value [0.407] [0.560] [0.308] [0.169] [0.041] [0.433] [0.109] [0.021] [0.335] 
Adjusted R² 0.564 0.565 0.562 0.206 0.208 0.191 0.217 0.209 0.211 
Fisher Statistics 52.851*** 53.084*** 52.360*** 26.947*** 26.797*** 25.203*** 31.687*** 30.848*** 29.982*** 
Observations 452 452 452 450 450 450 452 452 452 
First-Set of Instruments :               Constant; English ; Christianity; Middle  Income; Lower Middle Income 
Second-Set of Instruments :           Constant; French; Islam; Lower Income; Upper Middle Income 
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (): z-statistics. []: p-values corresponding to OIR-Sargan test.  OIR: 
Overidentifying Restrictions test. NODAgdp: NODA on GDP. NODAMDgdp: NODA from Multilateral Donors on GDP.  NODADACgdp: 
NODA  from DAC  countries on GDP.   
 
Concerning the second issue, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the OIR test in almost 
all regressions signifies that the instruments do not explain GQ dynamics through other 
mechanisms beyond NODA channels. Thus, the instruments are valid and not correlated with the 
disturbance term in the main equation (the instruments do not suffer-from endogeneity). Most of 
the control variables are significant with the expected signs.  Democratic institutions improve 
government quality while  public investment is often associated with poor management and 
corrupt practices in contract allocation. According to Ndikumana & Baliamoune-Lutz (2008), the 
positive association between public investment and corruption supports the view that corrupt 
bureaucrats aim to increase capital expenditures (over maintenance expenditure) to maximize 
private gains (rent-seeking). The interest in this explanation is that public investment may 
increase corruption. The analysis in Table 3 is replicated with the second-set of moment 
conditions to confirm the robustness of results. We provide more in-depth discussion on NODA 
and governance dynamics for estimations robust to standard errors in Section 4.3.    
 
4.3 Development assistance and quality of government (with HAC standard errors) 
 
Table 4 below presents HAC-2SLS results. On a first note, results of the Hausman-test 
confirm the choice of our estimation approach. The Sargan-OIR test statistics also confirm the 
validity of the instruments in all regressions. Findings based on HAC-2SLS regressions broadly 
confirm those in Table 3. This is also the case when the analysis is replicated with an alternative 
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set of instruments. In substance, both the NODA regressors and control variables are significant 
with the right signs. Accordingly, democracy has a positive effect on the dependent variables.  
The fact that the coefficients for the aid variables are not significant when considering political 
stability or voice & accountability merit emphasis, as  such diverges from the results obtained 
previously. The divergence is because the standard errors of results of Table 4 are robust to 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelations. 
 The following specific findings can be established. First, foreign aid has no apparent 
effect on political governance which is measured by political stability and voice & 
accountability. Hence, we may conclude that foreign aid has no significant effect in the election 
and replacement of political leaders. Second, based on the magnitude and signs of estimated 
coefficients, it could be inferred that foreign assistance has a deteriorating impact on economic 
governance relative to institutional governance.  
Table 4: Two-stage regressions with HAC standard errors  
 Political Stability Government Effectiveness Control  of Corruption 
          
Constant  -1.080 -1.089 -1.093 -0.094 -0.155 -0.066 -0.631*** -0.649*** -0.621*** 
 (-0.882) (-0.882) (-0.899) (-0.151) (-0.246) (-0.107) (-3.492) (-3.580) (-3.451) 
NODAgdp  -0.026 --- --- -0.038*** --- --- -0.023** --- --- 
 (-1.632)   (-3.071)   (-2.454)   
NODAMDgdp  --- -0.062 --- --- -0.087*** --- --- -0.053** --- 
  (-1.639)   (-3.030)   (-2.384)  
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.046 --- --- -0.068*** --- --- -0.041** 
   (-1.580)   (-3.010)   (-2.474) 
Democracy  0.173*** 0.177*** 0.171*** 0.120*** 0.127*** 0.116*** 0.105** 0.107** 0.104** 
 (3.020) (3.028) (3.016) (2.957) (3.021) (2.907) (2.368) (2.377) (2.347) 
Public Investment 0.040 0.038 0.043 -0.070 -0.068 -0.070 --- --- --- 
 (0.269) (0.251) (0.292) (-0.936) (-0.887) (-0.955)    
          
Hausman-test 26.843*** 26.922*** 29.052*** 109.52*** 104.11*** 120.05*** 49.346*** 50.302*** 49.910*** 
OIR-Sargan test 0.199 0.003 0.709 0.425 2.143 0.000 0.039 0.695 0.214 
P-value [0.654] [0.950] [0.399] [0.514] [0.143] [0.983] [0.980] [0.706] [0.898] 
Adjusted R² 0.325 0.324 0.314 0.204 0.205 0.186 0.177 0.172 0.167 
Fisher Statistics 4.962*** 5.071*** 4.871*** 8.675*** 9.561*** 7.995*** 6.416*** 6.315*** 6.400*** 
Observations 452 452 452 443 443 443 514 514 514 
          
 Voice and Accountability Regulation Quality Rule of Law 
          
Constant  -0.693 -0.686 -0.706 -0.204 -0.259 -0.180 -0.357 -0.415 -0.334 
 (-1.142) (-1.122) (-1.173) (-0.278) (-0.343) (-0.249) (-0.447) (-0.508) (-0.427) 
NODAgdp  -0.008 --- --- -0.030** --- --- -0.033** --- --- 
 (-0.884)   (-2.542)   (-2.331)   
NODAMDgdp  --- -0.021 --- --- -0.068** --- --- -0.074** --- 
  (-0.915)   (-2.412)   (-2.203)  
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.014 --- --- -0.054*** --- --- -0.060** 
   (-0.845)   (-2.594)   (-2.385) 
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Democracy  0.198*** 0.199*** 0.198*** 0.115** 0.121*** 0.112** 0.139** 0.146*** 0.135** 
 (5.367) (5.457) (5.323) (2.545) (2.644) (2.479) (2.561) (2.631) (2.531) 
Public Investment  -0.057 -0.058 -0.055 -0.053 -0.052 -0.053 -0.049 -0.048 -0.048 
 (-0.822) (-0.829) (-0.811) (-0.590) (-0.558) (-0.600) (-0.520) (-0.493) (-0.528) 
          
Hausman-test 46.888*** 44.846*** 42.808*** 48.153*** 44.185*** 54.739*** 81.226*** 79.312*** 89.942*** 
OIR-Sargan test 0.685 0.338 1.038 1.890 4.163** 0.612 2.559 5.310** 0.929 
P-value [0.407] [0.560] [0.308] [0.169] [0.041] [0.433] [0.109] [0.021] [0.335] 
Adjusted R² 0.564 0.565 0.562 0.206 0.208 0.191 0.217 0.209 0.211 
Fisher Statistics 18.040*** 18.748*** 17.450*** 9.415*** 9.547*** 9.123*** 7.991*** 8.196*** 7.789*** 
Observations 452 452 452 450 450 450 452 452 452 
First-Set of Instruments :              Constant; English ; Christianity; Middle  Income; Lower Middle Income 
Second-Set of Instruments:          Constant; French; Islam; Lower Income; Upper Middle Income 
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (): z-statistics. []: p-values corresponding to OIR-Sargan test.  OIR: 
Overidentifying Restrictions test. NODAgdp: NODA on GDP. NODAMDgdp:NODA from Multilateral Donors on GDP.  NODADACgdp: 
NODA  from DAC  countries on GDP.   
 
 
4.4 Further discussion, policy implications and caveats 
 
 Our findings have revealed that development assistance deteriorates economic (regulation 
quality and government effectiveness) and institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) 
governance, but has an insignificant effect on political (political stability, voice & 
accountability) governance. While, these results are broadly in accordance with Moyo (2009) 
and Collier (2007) on weak governance, they neither confirm the Eubank (2012) position on 
political governance nor the Asongu (2012a) stance on the aid-corruption nexus in his debate 
with Okada & Samreth (2012). 
The results on the negative linkages are also broadly in line with recent development 
literature (Wamboye et al., 2013; Marglin, 2013; Banuri, 2013; Titumir & Kamal, 2013; Krause, 
2013; Ghosh, 2013; Monni & Spaventa, 2013). Indeed, the stance of Amin (2014) on 
neocolonialism governing aid is in accordance with Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) on the entrapment 
of the continent within the global colonial webs of power or Kindiki (2011) on the imperative for 
countries on the African continent to strategically overcome dependence on international regimes 
(Asongu, 2014a). According to Amin, development should not be limited to the Washington 
Consensus and donor thoughts about what is good for Africa. Consistent with the author, aid 
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allocation processes and decisions should be a process that prioritises African interest (Obeng-
Odoom, 2013).  
The insignificant relationship with political governance is not broadly consistent the 
recommendations of Boone (1996) that, targeting liberal political regimes, could be more 
feasible in mitigating poverty. This inference is based on the theoretical underpinning that 
foreign aid is meant to improve political governance which ultimately leads to economic 
development. The conclusions of Tavares (2003) on the negative relationship between foreign 
aid and political governance are not apparent in the findings. Conversely, our results are in line 
with Rajan & Subramanian (2007) on the negative linkage between aid and governance and 
(Brautigam & Knack (2004, p. 266) on the negative effect of foreign aid on African governance. 
The unappealing relationship between development assistance and government quality 
could be traceable to the manner in which the allocation and results of aid are influenced by 
politics. In essence, aid supply is made  contingent on the willingness of recipient countries to 
bow to conditions and political motivations of donor countries. Accordingly, the political 
economy perspective of development assistance is crucially relevant in understanding the results 
because the motives of aid are products of institutions, culture, dynamics of competitive interest 
and power distribution (Schraeder et al., 1998; Hopkins, 2000; Asongu, 2014a). Development 
assistance is also the result of bargaining in some type of political market that consists of donor 
aid bureaucracies, recipient government officials and multilateral aid agencies. In essence, the 
multiple motivations of donors vary over time. For example, to some extent, Japanese aid is 
motivated by economic gains, Nordic aid by global welfare improvements and French aid by 
political goals. Therefore, French motivations to maintain their colonial legacies could explain 
our findings to some extent.  
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 It is logical to expect the above results because, until the 1990s, Cold war strategies were 
to a marked degree  prime motivation for development assistance. In that époque, recipient 
countries did not fail because the interests of Cold war combatants were at stake and genuine 
development was a secondary concern. Therefore the rent-seeking elites were not constrained by 
donors to account for aid effectiveness. Hence, it is far from surprising that in the aftermath of 
the Cold war, countries that were once sustained by aid began openly failing in terms of 
governance. This confirms the long-standing consensus among some analysts that donor 
governments are essentially to blame for placing priorities on their interests: particularly 
commercial and political goals (Roggoff, 2014).  
To put the above paragraph into greater perspective, it is important to note that 
imperialism and neocolonialism have substantially dominated the aid agenda. In this vein, 
donors have always sought to improve their realm of influence for each dollar disbursed in aid. 
With the exception of fast growing economies in Asia, recipients in Africa have moved towards 
giving-in to more concessions to the preferences of donors. The 1960 days when Egypt 
thoroughly resisted aid from the West are over. In African economies, aid receiving countries 
have begun constructing a supplicant mentality, coming-up with a range of projects with the aim 
of getting more aid (Lancaster, 1999; Hopkins, 2000; Asongu, 2014a). Under this scenario, 
donors bargain for greater influence. The colonial powers have the leverage to request higher 
policy standards in exchange for their money. Unfortunately, their demands are not always in the 
interest of advancing recipient countries. A case in point is a recent decision by the USA and 
British governments to curtail aid to African countries because of anti-gay laws. In February 
2014, the World Bank also suspended a loan package to Uganda because an anti-gay bill 
approved by the Ugandan legislature had been signed into law by President Yoweri Museveni.  
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Our conclusions are relevant to the case study of Uganda because we have established 
that foreign aid has no significant effect on ‘regime change’ or political governance. This 
inference is substantiated by other notable cases like Zimbabwe where the distortion of foreign 
aid to effect ‘regime change’ is not working. A possible explanation is that, the manipulation of 
foreign aid to effect political outcomes may be used by populist parties to instill nationalistic 
sentiments among the electorate. The neocolonial slogan used by President Robert Mugabe is 
such an example (Mod, 2013).   
It is also interesting to note that not only donors could be responsible for the adverse 
consequences of foreign aid on good governance, initial conditions of bad governance in 
recipient countries could also play a crucial role, especially when such countries were  already 
corrupt prior to receiving foreign aid. This means, the deterioration of governance standards by 
foreign aid could be a two-way street. Hence, efforts might need to come from both fronts 
(donors and recipients) in measures to mitigate the issue. This concern about initial conditions is 
an interesting future research direction.   
A potential caveat in the paper is that a claim by prior literature that the colonial legacy 
has influenced the quality of institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001) may raise some issues about the 
exogeneity of this variable as an instrument.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 The paper has investigated the effect of foreign aid on governance in order to extend the 
debates on  it and verify common positions from Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’, Collier’s ‘Bottom Billion’ 
and Eubank’s ‘Somaliland’. The empirical evidence is based on updated data from 52 African 
countries for the period 1996-2010.  An endogeneity robust instrumental variable two-stage-least 
squares empirical strategy has been employed. The findings reveal that development assistance 
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deteriorates economic (regulation quality and government effectiveness) and institutional 
(corruption-control and rule of law) governance, but has an insignificant effect on political 
(political stability and voice & accountability) governance.  While, these findings are broadly in 
accordance with Moyo (2009) and Collier (2007) on weak governance, they neither confirm the 
Eubank (2012) position on political governance nor the Asongu (2012) stance on the aid-
corruption nexus in his debate with Okada & Samreth (2012). 
At least two policy implications are noteworthy. First, the use foreign aid as an 
instrument to influence the election and replacement of political leaders in Africa may have 
insignificant results.  Second, it is time to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid together with 
high time economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which 
foreign aid is used to influence economic, institutional and political governance in recipient 
countries.   
Maybe the success of action in society depends on more particular facts than anyone can 
possibly know. As Hayek (1988) posited “the curious task in economics is to demonstrate to 
men how little they know about what they imagine they can design”. Once economists stop being 
too optimistic, there is hope to hold donors accountable for such piecemeal outcomes as well-
maintained roads, water supply, medicines, textbooks and nutritional supplements to improve the 
wellbeing of the poorest people in the world.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics 
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
 
Development  
Assistance  
Net Development Assistance(NODA)  10.811 12.774 -0.251 148.30 704 
NODA from Multilateral Donors    4.481 5.512 -1.985 64.097 704 
NODA from DAC countries   6.244 8.072 -0.679 97.236 704 
       
 
 
Government 
Quality  
 
 
Control of Corruption  -0.603 0.628 -2.495 1.086 611 
Government Effectiveness -0.665 0.606 -1.853 0.807 587 
Political Stability  -0.563 0.963 -3.311 1.143 624 
Regulation Quality  -0.673 0.673 -2.729 0.905 620 
Rule of Law -0.700 0.686 -2.691 1.053 622 
Voice and Accountability  -0.678 0.739 -2.174 1.047 624 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Population growth 2.359 1.015 -1.081 10.043 780 
Trade  78.352 39.923 17.859 275.23 705 
Democracy  2.307 4.089 -8.000 10.000 735 
Public Investment  7.489 4.535 0.000 39.984 641 
       
 
 
 
Instrumental 
Variables 
English Common-Law 0.384 0.486 0.000 1.000 780 
French Civil-Law  0.615 0.486 0.000 1.000 780 
Christianity  0.634 0.481 0.000 1.000 780 
Islam  0.365 0.481 0.000 1.000 780 
Low Income  0.576 0.494 0.000 1.000 780 
Middle Income 0.423 0.494 0.000 1.000 780 
Lower Middle Income  0.230 0.421 0.000 1.000 780 
Upper Middle Income  0.192 0.394 0.000 1.000 780 
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.  
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Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis 
Quality of Government Dev. Assistance Control Variables Instrumental Variables  
CC Gov.E PolS R.Q R.L V&A TA MLD DAC Popg Trade Demo PubI Eng. Frch. Chris Islam LI MI LMI UMI  
1.000 0.846 0.691 0.733 0.871 0.668 -0.14 -0.12 -0.14 -0.28 0.157 0.491 0.212 0.118 -0.11 0.133 -0.13 -0.32 0.322 0.071 0.327 CC 
 1.000 0.659 0.806 0.890 0.703 -0.27 -0.25 -0.24 -0.36 0.115 0.459 0.123 0.293 -0.29 0.057 -0.05 -0.42 0.424 0.156 0.361 Gov.E 
  1.000 0.643 0.802 0.661 -0.14 -0.12 -0.14 -0.22 0.312 0.528 0.252 0.060 -0.06 0.171 -0.17 -0.26 0.266 -0.03 0.367 PolS 
   1.000 0.816 0.715 -0.24 -0.22 -0.23 -0.19 -0.00 0.519 0.078 0.134 -0.13 0.077 -0.07 -0.27 0.274 0.106 0.231 R.Q 
    1.000 0.728 -0.20 -0.17 -0.20 -0.29 0.173 0.536 0.224 0.164 -0.16 0.115 -0.11 -0.35 0.357 0.084 0.359 R.L 
     1.000 -0.00 -0.00 0.002 -0.15 0.041 0.755 0.025 0.255 -0.25 0.226 -0.22 -0.15 0.152 -0.08 0.279 V&A 
      1.000 0.900 0.955 0.368 -0.10 -0.03 0.195 -0.05 0.050 0.058 -0.05 0.450 -0.45 -0.26 -0.28 TA 
       1.000 0.733 0.400 -0.09 0.011 0.220 -0.03 0.035 -0.00 0.006 0.475 -0.47 -0.28 -0.29 MLD 
        1.000 0.304 -0.09 -0.05 0.141 -0.05 0.056 0.098 -0.09 0.382 -0.38 -0.22 -0.24 DAC 
         1.000 -0.25 -0.06 0.043 -0.10 0.107 0.008 -0.00 0.425 -0.42 -0.22 -0.29 Popg 
          1.000 0.016 0.175 0.176 -0.17 0.181 -0.18 -0.35 0.35 0.137 0.294 Trade 
           1.000 0.147 0.177 -0.17 0.163 -0.16 -0.03 0.034 -0.16 0.228 Demo 
            1.000 -0.13 0.138 0.008 -0.00 -0.04 0.049 0.002 0.059 PubI 
             1.000 -1.00 0.189 -0.18 -0.04 0.043 -0.05 0.115 Eng. 
              1.000 -0.18 0.189 0.043 -0.04 0.057 -0.11 Frch. 
               1.000 -1.00 -0.00 0.003 -0.15 0.167 Chris 
                1.000 0.003 -0.00 0.153 -0.16 Islam 
                 1.000 -1.00 -0.63 -0.56 LI 
                  1.000 0.639 0.569 MI 
                   1.000 -0.26 LMI 
                    1.000 UMI 
CC: Control of Corruption.  Gov. E: Government Effectiveness. PolS: Political Stability or No Violence. R.Q: Regulation Quality. R.L: Rule of Law.  V& A: Voice and Accountability. TA: Total  development 
assistance.  MLD: Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  Popg: Population growth. Demo: Democracy.  PubI:Public Investment.  Eng: English 
Common-Law. Frch: French Civil-Law. Chris: Christian Religion. LI: Low Income. MI: Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions  
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
Net Development Assistance(NODA)  NODAgdp NODA (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
NODA from Multilateral Donors  NODAMDgdp NODAMDgdp(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
NODA from DAC Countries  NODADACgdp NODADACgdp(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
 
Control of Corruption  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private 
interests”. 
World Bank(WDI) 
    
 
Government Effectiveness 
 
Gov. E 
“Government effectiveness (estimates): measures 
the quality of public services, the quality and 
degree of independence from political pressures 
of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation and the 
credibility of governments’ commitments to such 
policies”. 
World Bank(WDI) 
    
 
Political Stability/ No Violence  
 
PolS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimates): 
measured as the perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism” 
World Bank(WDI) 
    
 
Regulation Quality  
 
R.Q 
“Regulation quality (estimates): measured as the 
ability of a government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development”. 
World Bank(WDI) 
    
 
Rule of Law 
 
R.L 
“Rule of law (estimates): captures perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confidence in, 
abide by the rules of society, in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence”. 
World Bank(WDI) 
    
 
Voice and Accountability  
 
V & A 
“Voice and accountability (estimates): measure 
the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to 
enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and a free media” 
World Bank(WDI) 
    
Trade(Openness) Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Population growth  Popg Average annual population growth rate  World Bank(WDI) 
    
Democracy Demo Level of Institutionalized Democracy  World Bank(WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubI Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank(WDI) 
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  
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